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INTRODUCTION
When I started my professional life in the European
institutional world, in 1975, Europe was slowly emerging from
the economic difficulties and the political implications of the
1973 oil crisis, and the Institutions were not at their best. The
Council had not voted for years, stuck as it was in the straitjacket
of the so-called Luxemburg compromise, and would spend
Director, Legal Service, Council of the European Union. The views expressed are
the Author’s alone and do not commit in any way either the Council or its Legal
Service.
1. Jean-Paul Jacqué, Introduction to GEN. SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPE: DONNER CORPS À UNE IDÉE (2009).
*
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months negotiating the slightest details in order to find the
consensus which represented the only way to move on. The
Commission was not as strong as it had been some years before,
when Walter Hallstein was in the Chair, and hardly submitted
proposals to a Council which would not vote on them anyway.
The European Parliament did not have many powers, although
it had just been granted some in the budgetary field, and was
already struggling for more. Having at last joined the European
Communities, the United Kingdom was already making things
difficult for its partners on the ground that its contribution to
the common budget was unfair, in spite of the largely positive
outcome of the June 1975 referendum following the first
renegotiation of that contribution by Harold Wilson. And the
newly created European Council had met for the first time, in
March 1975, in Dublin.
Almost forty years on, as I approach the end of my
professional career, and while Europe is slowly emerging from
five years of financial and sovereign debt crisis, one cannot really
say that European Institutions are performing at their best, apart
from the European Council that has now become the fully
fledged institution to which everybody periodically turns, waiting
for the real business to be done. The Council, squeezed between
the European Parliament and the European Council, is at pains
to find its own way. The European Parliament has now got a lot
of powers, though it mainly uses them to try and get even more
rather than to promote the European interest; and the
Commission is as politically weak as it has never been before, not
even in the early seventies when Franco Maria Malfatti stepped
down from its Chair to run for Italian national elections. The
United Kingdom, having been a member of the European
Union for forty years, is considering whether it should leave it,
while still quarrelling about its contribution to the budget.
Make no mistake, should you be tempted to conclude that
actually things never change, as time goes by, in the European
Union: nothing could be less true. Major steps forward were
made, which radically changed the nature of European
integration, although some good opportunities were also
missed, which could have made European integration even
stronger.
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March 13th, 1979—three days before the death of Jean
Monnet—is the birthdate of the European monetary system, an
often underscored mechanism which, however, paved the way to
economic and monetary union. Three months later, the first
direct elections of the members of the Assembly were to take
place and to give rise to high expectations as to how it would
play its role.
1985 saw the relaunching of European integration, which
had been suffering from the combined stalemates of the sixties’
“empty chair” institutional crisis and the seventies’ economic
one. Jacques Delors pushed for the Single market completion
programme; and the Single European Act made a breakthrough
for the European project: the Commission started to make
proposals again and the Council returned to vote.
1992 was a landmark moment for Europe. In the politically
modified European landscape which followed the crush of the
Berlin wall, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty gave birth to the
European Union. Unfortunately the lessons of the difficulties
encountered in the ratification process would not be learnt.
And, between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, Europe
accomplished the two most important steps of its young history:
the launching of a single currency and the doubling of its own
size, as it welcomed “the other side of the Berlin wall”.
Unfortunately again, Europe missed an opportunity to adapt its
architecture to an enlarged family club.
European
integration
is
thus
punctuated
by
accomplishments though it is also marked by missed
opportunities. Looking back on almost forty years, they all show
up, in a disorderly way; and it is only natural to try and take
stock, in particular when contributing to the theme of this
Spring Issue, “The EU in the Twenty-first Century,” which
reminds of the importance of learning the lessons from the past.
This does not claim to be an account of European
integration’s major events though, nor even an overview thereof.
This Article only intends to offer an insider view of some of
those steps forward and missed opportunities, in a few
snapshots, or “keywords”: their choice is not based on any
alphabetical or chronological criterion, which also means that
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this paper can be read in whatever order one wishes to.2 And it
goes without saying that it is exclusively made of the personal
recollection and views of the author and could in no way
commit the Institution which he had the pleasure and the
honor to serve for so long.
I. MAASTRICHT
As of today, Maastricht remains the highest achievement of
the European integration process.
The Treaty on European Union—better known as the
Maastricht Treaty3—could hardly be expected to be what it
actually became until the Spring of 1990. The fall of the Berlin
wall, late in 1989, and its implications for Europe’s political
environment had convinced the European leaders of the need
to start a second project, besides the one—which had been
under way for more than one year—on economic and monetary
union. The objective was to strengthen the political links
between the Twelve and put the ultimate seal on the European
choice which a unified Germany was willing and ready to make.
The decision was taken by the European Heads of State or
Government at Strasbourg, in December 1989, and confirmed
in Dublin in April and June 1990, to hold a separate
intergovernmental conference, of a wider scope, in order to
further develop the process of European integration and with a
view to marking “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe.”4
The Maastricht Treaty was thus the outcome of two, instead
of one, intergovernmental conferences. Both opened in Rome
on December 15, 1990. The first one, on economic and
monetary union, had been prepared by several reports5 and had
2. Given the nature of this Article, which is based on the Author’s personal
experience, footnoting shall be limited to basic references.
3. On the Maastricht Treaty, see YVES DOUTRIAUX, LE TRAITÉ SUR L’UNION
EUROPÉENNE (1992); see also MAARTJE DE VISSER & ANNE PIETER VAN DER MEI, THE
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 1993-2013: REFLECTIONS FROM MAASTRICHT (2013).
4. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text) art. A, 1992 O.J. C 191/1, at 4
[hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
5. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989) [hereinafter
Delors Report]. The Delors Report was prepared by the Delors Committee, which had
been mandated by the Hannover European Council in June 1988 to study and propose
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its mandate approved by the Rome European Council in
October 1990.6 The second one, which was labelled “political
union,” had seen its mandate hastily drafted in a few weeks by
the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve to be approved in Rome on
the very eve of its opening; it was meant to cover a very broad
range of issues, including new fields of competences, the
efficiency (a key word for increasing the scope of qualified
majority in the Council) and democratic legitimacy (a key word
for increasing the powers of the European Parliament) of the
institutional system, as well as opening the ground for a
European common foreign and security policy.
The drafting of the Maastricht Treaty was the first tangible
and successful attempt to make the objective of a European
Union a reality. That objective, first set at the Paris Summit of
1972,7 then mentioned in the Tindemans report at the end of
1975,8 taken up in the Genscher-Colombo “draft European Act”
of 19819 and in the European Council Stuttgart Declaration of
1983,10 revived by the Spinelli Draft Treaty approved by the
European Parliament in February 198411 and mentioned again
in the preamble of the Single European Act two years later,12
finally became concrete in the early hours of Wednesday,
concrete stages leading towards economic and monetary union. It was submitted to,
and approved by the Madrid European Council in June 1989; and it was followed by
the Report of the High Level group chaired by Elisabeth Guigou. In the meantime, the
central bank governors had prepared the future statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
6. The mandate was approved by all the Member States, with the exception of the
United Kingdom, which could not share the objective of a single currency.
7. See Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of
the Enlarged Community meeting for the first time on October 19 and 20 in Paris, E.C.
BULL., no. 10, at 15 (1972).
8. Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European
Council, on the European Union, E.C. BULL. Supp., no. 1 (1976).
9. Draft European Act, German- Italian Initiative submitted to the European
Council of 26 and 27 November 1981, E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 87 (1981).
10. Solemn Declaration on European Union, E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 24 (1983).
11. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984 O.J. C 77/33. On the
Draft Treaty, see FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI ET AL., LE TRAITÉ D’UNION EUROPÉENNE, A
COMMENTARY (1985).
12. Single European Act, done at Luxemborug on February 17 and at the Hague
on February 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. L 169/1 [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]). On the Single European Act, see JEAN DE RUYT, L’ACTE
UNIQUE EUROPÉEN (1989).
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December 11, 1991, when a deal was struck by the leaders of the
Twelve in the seat of the Limburg “Provinciehuis.”
The “Greek Temple” architectural model was chosen, early
in the course of negotiations, to take account of the need to
have three sets of rules—three “pillars”—coexisting within one
single Treaty, which was due to establish the European Union.13
Normally, this should have rallied the support of all those who
had been pleading for a stronger European integration. That
was however not the case: the “Greek Temple” model was—
willingly or not—misunderstood as introducing intergovernmentalism in the future European Union; unfortunately,
the Commission did not counter that trend. The “Greek
Temple” model lived on to be one of the main features of the
new Treaty.
The Maastricht Treaty is the result of a major effort of
constitutional craftsmanship: it employs the classical method of
a Treaty amending existing Treaties, while going at the same
time beyond.14 Inevitably, its structure was bound to be
complicated by the dimension of the project. The way in which
the Maastricht Treaty is drafted was criticized in the aftermath of
the signing and all throughout the process of ratification. Its
supposed lack of clarity was actually among the main arguments
of those who opposed the ratification (the same happened for
the Nice15 and, to a lesser extent, the Amsterdam16 Treaties).
13. The three “pillars” would be held together by a “pediment,” composed by the
principles and objectives, as well as the common institutional framework of the
European Union, and by a “basement” which englobed the final provisions of the
Treaty, namely a single set of procedures to revise the newly created TEU and the
existing EC Treaties, and to accede thereto (that means that the Amsterdam Treaty, as
well as the accession of new Member States, would henceforth follow a single, unified
procedure).
14. The Treaty is made of seven Titles and nineteen Articles. Those articles
contain thirty-four new Treaty articles plus 136 amendments to the existing Treaty
provisions, some of those amendments aiming at introducing up to twenty-seven new
Treaty articles. The result of the IGC also includes seventeen protocols and thirty-three
declarations.
15. On the Nice Treaty, see DAVID GALLOWAY, THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND:
REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS OF POWER IN THE EU (2001).
16. On the Amsterdam Treaty, see Jean-Claude Piris & Giorgio Maganza, The
Amsterdam Treaty: Overview and Institutional Aspects, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S32 (1998);
see also Giorgio Maganza, Réflexions sur le Traité d’Amsterdam-contexte Général et Quelques
Aspects Particuliers, 43 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 657, 657–70
(1997).
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Twelve years later, the Constitutional Treaty, which was signed
in Rome on October 29, 2004, and represented a fair answer to
that criticism, by providing a clear and readable text, was
criticized in the very same terms as the previous Treaties. It is
worth reflecting thereupon (see infra Constitutions and
Treaties).
In Maastricht, the European Union acquired, to different
degrees, powers in practically all the domains in which States
normally operate, from foreign policy to immigration, from
culture to the currency, which can still be considered today as
the main accomplishment of the Maastricht reform.
The Maastricht meeting, which lasted two days and two
nights, closed with mixed feelings, as normally is the case when
compromises have to be found. Somehow, one could sense the
feeling from the comments of ministers walking out of the
meeting room that more could have been achieved and that
things remained to be done: Article N(2) of the Maastricht
Treaty, which calls for a new IGC to be convened in 1996,
reflects that sense of frustration. However, one had also
distinctly perceived throughout the whole meeting—from its
breakthrough to its moments of fatigue—the sense that a major
step in the process of European integration was in the making,
and that more would come.17 And indeed the Maastricht Treaty
remains the unmatched achievement of European integration.
II. ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
Although, as time has shown, it was born “unfinished,”
economic and monetary union was—and no doubt remains—a
success scored through the Maastricht Treaty and a major step
forward in the process of European integration. Contrary to the
political union “patchwork,” which encompassed several
different issues and had lost its name by the time that Treaty was
signed, economic and monetary union was the outcome of a
very long and winding process, launched twenty years before
that signing.
The realization of a single market—where goods, persons,
services and capitals can move freely—does not go, in the long
17. See Maastricht TEU, supra note 4, pmbl., 1992 O.J. C 191/1, at 2. (“In view of
further steps to be taken in order to advance European integration.”).
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run, without the idea of a single currency. Still, the monetary
union was not among the original Treaties’ objectives, probably
because Bretton Woods ruled, at that time, the international
monetary system. The 1969 Hague Summit, which was about to
open a new stage for European integration, mentioned the
objective of economic and monetary union for the first time.
And, when the dollar stopped, two years later, to be convertible
in gold, sealing the end of the Bretton Woods system, European
leaders started to think in concrete terms of monetary union.
It is interesting to note that one of the first attempts in this
respect, the 1970 Werner Report,18 already contained
suggestions for building such a union in three stages, by 1980,
remodeling the distribution of powers between Member States
and European institutions. Following the brief experience of the
monetary “snake” in the early seventies—which consisted of a
concerted floating of European currencies to the dollar—the
debate was taken up by two former Finance ministers, Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, who happened to be
chosen in 1974 as French President and German Chancellor
respectively, as well as by the newly appointed British President
of the Commission, Roy Jenkins. The latter unexpectedly
focused a Jean Monnet lecture at the Florence European
University Institute, in October 1977, on monetary union and
on the advantages of creating a new international currency,19
while the former jointly promoted, at the end of 1978, the
creation of the European Monetary System (“EMS”).20
Conceived to bring monetary stability to Europe, the EMS
proved to be an efficient tool, living through a difficult period of
monetary fluctuations; it actually built the bridge to the
Maastricht economic and monetary union reform. The EMS was
18. The Werner Report was named after the Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre
Werner, who headed the High Level Experts’ group mandated by the Council after the
Hague Summit to examine the options for a staged realization of economic and
monetary union.
19. ROY JENKINS, A LIFE AT THE CENTRE 432 (1991).
20. Presidency Conclusion, European Council, (Dec. 1978) and the European
Council Resolution attached thereto. As from 1999 European Council conclusions are
available on the website of the European Council, at http://register.consilium.
europa.eu and, for older texts, at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/councilmeetings/conclusions/archives-2002-1993, and at http://www.european-council.
europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions/archives-1992-1975.
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based upon a unit of account (the European Currency Unit or
“ECU”), which was the denomination for the weighted average
of European currencies linked and floating together within a
narrow band; the ECU was a success in the financial markets as
among private operators; in a few years’ time, it had ranked with
the US dollar and the yen on top of the currencies used by
international markets. The European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM”) also included an intervention mechanism and credit
facility schemes. It would enter into force in March 1979 and the
United Kingdom would remain out of it.
Ten years later, the Delors Committee was mandated by the
European Council to propose concrete stages to bring Europe
to a single currency. In the meantime, there had been the
relaunching of European integration through the completion of
the Single Market and the signing of the Single European Act,21
which contained a chapter devoted to economic and monetary
union and referred to the need to build on the ESM and ECU
experience, as well as to possible Treaty amendments in that
domain.22 Like the Werner Report, the report which Jacques
Delors submitted to the Madrid European Council in June 1989
was also based on the three stage approach and allowed the
European leaders to open the way to an intergovernmental
conference, which would meet after the beginning of the first
stage, the completion of free movement of capitals, on July 1,
1990.23
The road to economic and monetary union thus reached its
turning point at Maastricht, when ideas floated two decades
earlier and developed through Plans and Reports, then through
concrete mechanisms, landed in the elaborated form of draft
Treaty articles on an IGC signing table in the evening of
February 7, 1992. In the meantime though, hard negotiations
had been going on.

21. It is not by chance that 1985, the year of the relaunching of European
integration, opened with the arrival of Jacques Delors in the Commission Chair: he
would prove to be by far the most effective, most pro-European, and politically
strongest Chair during the period covered by this contribution, and probably of all
time.
22. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1, pmbl., art. 20.
23. Delors Report, supra note 5.
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As a result, the Treaty provisions on economic and
monetary union look of a diversified nature. On one side, there
is a chapter on Monetary policy, the technically accomplished
product of the long journey initiated at The Hague Summit of
1969: it actually transferred monetary sovereignty to the
European Institutions, notably the European Central Bank to be
created at the beginning of the third stage within a European
system of Central Banks. On the other side, the Economic policy
chapter contains less ambitious provisions, resting on the
coordination of Member States’ economic policies through peer
review procedures, which only allow the Union to recommend—
but not to enforce—changes. In spite of this somehow uneven
construction, which was bound to oblige economic and
monetary union to walk with a solid leg and a far weaker one,
the union lived through the skepticism of the early years,
probably also thanks to a favorable economic environment.
More importantly, it lived through the introduction of the euro,
overcoming the critics erupted in some Member States, where
politicians who had not been able to control prices during the
switch over period tried to blame inflation on the single
currency. Earlier on, there had been the negotiation and first
application of the Stability and Growth Pact, an attempt to
pump some muscles in the “economic leg.” However, fifteen
years after the beginning of the final stage of the economic and
monetary union, the financial crisis would end up laying bare
the inconsistencies of living with a fully fledged monetary union
among States which remain sovereign in their economic policy
choices. The advantage of having a real monetary and economic
union—an opportunity that some had seen slipping away in
1991, as others did not intend to seize it—appeared in full size
when the Union Institutions found themselves largely
underequipped to face a situation which would have required
larger powers than those conferred upon them by the
Maastricht signatories. The financial crisis left in particular the
euro area members in need to find adequate solutions within
the Treaty boundaries and with the means available therein:
sometimes they stretched those means to their limits, sometimes
they resorted to other ones (see infra Euro and Two Speed).
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III. ENLARGEMENT
Enlargement was the first big step forward that Europe took
in the new century, and a major achievement altogether. It
allowed ten new countries from Central and Eastern Europe,
plus Cyprus and Malta, to join the Union. After a long
negotiating process, those countries saw recognized their
being—as François Mitterrand had forcefully put it ten years
before—“not less European than us.” Enlargement was,
however, also a tremendous opportunity that Europe missed
when, at the same time, it failed to reshape and make a new start
on firmer constitutional bases, as the exceptional circumstances
of that anticipated event would have prompted it to do.
Up to a certain point in the late years of the twentieth
century, Europe used to prepare before enlarging to new
members. It stopped doing so at the turn of the twenty first
century; and the biggest enlargement ever happened without
the European Union having even strengthened its institutional
setting.24
That enlargement was not properly prepared. Time did not
lack though. Enlarging to the Central and Eastern European
countries had been a political must for Europe ever since the
Berlin Wall crumbled down in 1989. Hungary and Poland had
requested to access the Union as early as April 1994; Slovakia
and the three Baltic States, as well as Bulgaria, had done the
same in 1995. The Accession Treaty of ten new Member States
only entered into force on May 1, 2004, the one concerning
Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007. Twenty years had
been available to consider how to prepare better the most
important political event in the Union’s history after the
introduction of the single currency; and almost ten years to
define the technical arrangements which were to precede and
accompany that event. The debate had been opened in 1992,
when the then President of the European Commission, Jacques
Delors, started warning, in the aftermath of the Maastricht

24. See Giorgio Maganza, Can The Enlarged European Union Continue To Be That
United?, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1269, 1271 (2011).
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signing, about the need to strengthen the Union as a condition
for its enlargement.25
In the summer of 1997, his successor, Jacques Santer, had
come before a full European Parliament Strasbourg session,
accompanied by almost all the members of the Commission, to
present the “Agenda 2000,” a communication suggesting that
the Enlargement could still take place without affecting the
Union, provided that the latter previously took the necessary
adaptation measures, in terms of internal political reforms,
institutional and budgetary settings.26
In the meantime, one smaller enlargement to Austria,
Finland, and Sweden, as well as not less than three Treaty
revision negotiations had taken place. A lot of time indeed. Still,
when the Union membership finally doubled in size, the
institutional system was almost the same as the one originally
conceived by the founding Treaties for a club of Six, and hardly
readjusted ever since.
While Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were
only allowed to join the European Communities after the Six
agreed on “relaunching” the European project at the Hague
Summit of December 1969; while Portugal and Spain would only
join the Ten after the Single European Act; and while the
Maastricht Treaty could still be regarded as providing in turn a
basis for the newly established European Union to welcome
Austria, Finland and Sweden, the subsequent and longadvocated strengthening of the Union with the prospect of
adding Central and Eastern European countries, plus Cyprus
and Malta, actually never happened. No concrete action was
taken to make sure that the Union could continue, with a far
larger number of members, to function on as solid a basis and as
effectively as it did in the aftermath of Maastricht. In spite of the
best efforts, neither the Amsterdam nor the Nice Treaties
succeeded in reducing the number of members of the
Commission, in order to revive its independence and
supranational nature, or in making the Council more efficient
through a simpler decision-making and fewer vetoes. The
25. Commission Report on Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, E.C.
BULL., Supp., no. 3 (1992).
26. Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, EU. BULL., Supp., no. 5
(1997).
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Lisbon Treaty27 had managed at least to fix the size of the
Commission to two-thirds of the Union’s membership, but that
hardly negotiated achievement had to be quickly renounced to
appease the concerns of the Irish, who had voted against the
ratification of the Treaty in the June 2008 referendum. And no
particular effort was made to give the European political project
a firmer rooting in the more heterogeneous public opinions of
the Member States (see infra Citizens).
Thus, a good opportunity was missed to streamline the
work of the institutions and make them more efficient in a
larger Europe, in particular to have an efficient Commission,
independent from the Member States. And a great chance was
let go, at a turning point for the integration process, to have the
Union properly geared to continue working at the same pace as
before. The risk was indeed—and still is—to see the prospect for
European integration being diluted to the point of losing its
essential features.
With the accession of Croatia, on July 1, 2013, the Member
States of the European Union have grown to twenty-eight.
Negotiations with Turkey—the first country which formally
asked in 1963 to accede to the then Community of Six—were
officially launched in 2005 and stalled shortly thereafter. Other
Balkan countries are presently negotiating their accession to the
Union, while some wonder what are the geographical limits to
European integration.
As for those who keep pushing for a further enlargement of
the European Union, they should rather pause and consider, at
a time when the Union’s popularity is at the lowest and public
opinion sensitivity across Member States has grown more
diversified, whether the price might not be the “disintegration”
of the European project. It is no mystery that for some the
prospect of diluting the original supranational project into
something closer to a wide common market or to a classical
international organization would be less than a concern. That is
27. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. On the Lisbon Treaty, see generally,
JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2010); see
also Giorgio Maganza, The Lisbon Treaty: A Brief Outline, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1603
(2007); Jean-Paul Jacqué, Les Apparences et la Réalité: Retour sur Plusieurs Années de
Négociation, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 639, 639–42 (2009).
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why François Mitterrand and Jacques Delors had respectively
envisaged, as from the fall of the Berlin wall, a European
architecture based on a confederation of States (within which
would be placed a more integrated, federal entity) and the idea
of a “concentric circles Europe” (made of a federal heart, an
Economic Area and looser agreements on the edges). And that
is why a smaller group of Member States than the full
membership of the Union might one day decide to make a new
start and bring integration forward, without letting the enlarged
Union—to which they would still continue to belong—be an
obstacle to their further integration.
IV. CONSTITUTIONS AND TREATIES
The European integration process was launched, and then
developed over six decades, on the basis of international
Treaties. The Constitutional Treaty, which aborted in 2005, did
not mean to—and could not possibly—be a Constitution,
though a majority of French and Dutch citizens were let to
believe that it did or that it was.
The European Union, as the European Communities
before it, is founded upon a Treaty, concluded among sovereign
States. The Treaties establishing the European Communities
were signed and ratified by the (then six) Contracting Parties
and they only entered into force as a result of that ratification.28
The same went for all the other Treaties which amended those
Treaties, including the Single European Act of February 17 and
28, 1986, and the Treaty on European Union of February 7,
1992, as well as for all the Accession Treaties. The Paris Treaty of
May 27, 1952, establishing the European Defence Community
was rejected by the French Assemblée Nationale on August 30,
1954, and therefore never entered into force.
Over the years, the European Treaties were referred to,
including by the European Court of Justice, as the European

28. The Paris Treaty of April 18, 1951, which established the European Coal and
Steel Community, entered into force on January 1, 1953; and the Rome Treaties of
March 25, 1957, which established respectively the European Economic Community
and the European Community for Atomic Energy, entered into force on January 1,
1958.
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basic constitutional texts,29 without anybody having anything to
object. European leaders themselves, when they met in
December 2001 at the Laeken European Council, also referred
to a reorganization of the European Treaties which could
possibly lead to a constitutional text.30 And a “Constitutional
Treaty” indeed was delivered by the Convention, which had
been mandated at Laeken to address fundamental questions on
the Future of Europe and compact all the Treaty materials into a
single document.31
The Convention “model” had already been used to draft
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of
December 7, 2000, and it represented a considerable innovation
in Treaty-making. For the rest, the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional Treaty”) signed in
Rome on October 29, 2004 by all the (then twenty-five) Member
States of the European Union was the product of a classical
Treaty-revision process, like all the preceding European
Treaties, since it had been approved by the representatives of
the governments of all Member States in an IGC the
proceedings of which closed in June 2004. The Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe however contained the
word “Constitution” in its title and a few symbols of statehood in
the opening provisions (the anthem, the flag, the motto, the
celebration of the Europe Day), which could not—and were not
meant to—make the European Union a State, but certainly
irritated the eurosceptic camp, and probably ended up
contributing to the negative attitude of the majority of voters in
the French and Dutch national referenda.32
The fact that the European Communities, albeit born and
developed through Treaties, were more than classical
29. The Court called the Treaty “the basic constitutional charter” in 1986. Parti
écologiste ‘“Les Verts’” v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. I-1365,
23.
30. Presidency Conclusions, Laeken European Council (Dec. 14–15, 2001)
[hereinafter Laeken European Council], available at http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf.
31. See PETER NORMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION: THE STORY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2003) (on the Convention proceedings).
32. On May 29, 2005, about fifty-five percent of the French voters pronounced
against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty; three days later, the Dutch voters
against the Treaty were almost sixty-two percent.
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international organizations has been largely accepted since their
inception.33 The steps forward resulting from the Single
European Act in the eighties and, more importantly, the
Maastricht Treaty in the early nineties could only strengthen this
conclusion. However, a political and legal analysis of the
European Union’s configuration and the context in which the
Constitutional Treaty was drafted and agreed, between 2002 and
2004, could hardly leave any doubt as to the fact that the Union
did not look like a State, was not in the process of becoming
one, and, in particular, would not become one as a result of the
approval of the Constitutional Treaty.34 It was of course
legitimate to see an ambiguity in the way the Constitutional
Treaty was conceived and drafted. That was warranted, in the
first place, by its title, which merges two defining concepts from
international law and Constitutional law respectively, and,
secondly, by the idea of the Laeken summit to go “towards a
Constitution for European citizens” and to convene a
Convention on the Future of Europe, “composed of the main
parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union” (thus
representing not only Member States’ governments, but also
National Parliaments and the European Parliament) with the
task to consider the key issues arising for the Union’s future
development and to identify the various possible responses.35
That certainly represented a breakthrough from the familiar
Treaty-revision procedures; one should not forget however that
the Laeken Declaration itself had clearly specified that the final
decision would remain for an ICG to take. It is certain that the
actual conduct of the Convention proceedings, between 2002
and 2003—not to mention some declarations by its President,
Valery Giscard D’Estaing, drawing parallels with US
constitutional history—could only highlight the “constitutional”
nature of the work which the members of the Convention would
undertake and which indeed delivered a “Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe,” where the word “draft” even
happened to be omitted.
33. See, e.g., Flaminio Costa v. Enel, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. I-1141; see also
Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. I-6079.
34. See JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(2006).
35. Laeken European Council, supra note 30, at 23–24..
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Deliberate or not, that ambiguity did not serve the purpose
of the Constitutional Treaty, neither at the stage of the ICG,
which met in 2003 and 2004, nor during the process of
ratification, which opened in 2004 and was closed, in practice,
by the French36 and Dutch negative referenda, once that more
than half the number of the signatories to that Treaty had
already ratified it. In the end, the genuine attempt to picture the
European Union as what it was—that is to say, more than a
classical international organization, though not a State (nor a
federal State)—played against the Constitutional Treaty, whose
opponents kept warning against the first word, while ignoring
the second one, and were unfortunately, once again, left almost
unchallenged to do so.
Thus, regrettably, the Treaty was not judged on its merits.
And yet, it was a true attempt to provide an enlarged European
Union with a simplified structure and simpler and more
efficient procedures, concentrating in a readable single
document of 448 articles the whole of the existing Treaties,
which would have accordingly been repealed. It should make
people reflect though that the Constitutional Treaty was
criticized in the very same terms as, twelve years earlier, the
Maastricht Treaty, which confirms the relative value of giving
public opinions the final say on European Treaties.37
The tension between the constitutional and international
components of the European Union foundations went away in
2005, when the Constitutional Treaty was rejected. The word
“constitution” will probably not be inserted in a basic European
text for many years to come. That does not change the fact that
the basic European Treaties remain, as the Court of Justice
would already name them several years ago, the European
“Constitution.”

36. The negative referendum of May 29, 2005, represented the third time that
France, a founding member of the European Communities, stopped the European
integration process, after the failed ratification of the European Defence Community
and the long “empty chair” crisis.
37. Even if one assumes that a “constitutional” Treaty needed, as such, to be put
to referendum, it is easy to note that more than two thirds of the present Member
States’ constitutions have not been adopted through a referendum.
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V. EURO AND TWO SPEED
The idea that, in an enlarged European Union, every
Member State should not be bound to align on the smallest
common denominator has been debated for two decades now.38
As a first result of that debate, the Treaties of Amsterdam
(1997) and Nice (2000) set out and developed the “enhanced
cooperation” mechanism, meant to allow a group of Member
States to carry out, among themselves and using the European
Institutions, actions which the whole membership was not
willing to pursue, provided that the good functioning of the
internal market is not harmed.39 Experience showed however
that the mechanism—even in the more user friendly Nice
version, which remained unchanged under the Lisbon Treaty—
was of no easy access or use. Apart from the concept of
enhanced cooperation, which was retained in the Treaty, other
variants of the same idea had been put forward, such as
“flexibility,” one of the first denominations used in the
negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty; “à la carte,” which
rather suggested the idea of a pick-and-choose approach; the
“noyau dur” (core group) to indicate the option that some
Member States could move forward at a faster pace without
obliging those who could (or would) not do the same; as well as
the “centre of gravity” advocated by the former German
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer in 2000, calling for a
group of States to open the way to full political integration.
Sometimes, Two Speed was wrongly associated to Two Tier
Europe, which implies a permanent difference between two
groups of States. After all, one could say that the Union has
been working for some time now in a Multi-Speed way.40
For quite a long time, in any case, the European single
currency had not been associated with any Two Speed approach,
notwithstanding the fact that it had somehow and from the
beginning embodied that idea. True, the last stage of monetary
union was regularly quoted by academics as an example of
38. See, e.g., Maganza, supra note 24, at 1269.
39. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 20, 2012 O.J.
C 326/13, at 27–28 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; TFEU, supra note 27, arts. 326–34,
2012 O.J. C 326, at 189–92.
40. See JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A TWO-SPEED EU?
(2012).
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Treaty “in built” enhanced cooperation; however, that was more
a theoretical representation than the reference to an actual
reality.
The financial crisis has made Two Speed a reality. As from
the moment when the necessity appeared to provide financial
assistance to certain members of the euro area, the sheer
dimension of the financial needs involved made crystal clear
that the means available within the European Treaties and the
European budget would never be sufficient to cope with the
gravity of the situation. A first mechanism was thus created
outside the Treaties, in 2010, by the euro area Member States,
the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”), in order to
provide financial support to its members. When a second, more
robust mechanism, the ESM, was envisaged the same year, it was
felt however that a Treaty change was necessary for the sake of
acknowledging the possibility that euro area Member States may
conclude among themselves an agreement with the aim of
preserving the stability of the single currency which they
created. A third paragraph was thus added to Article 136 TFEU
reading “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the
stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict
conditionality.”41 It was the first time that a provision of such a
purely declaratory nature was entered in a European Treaty.
Less than a year later, another intergovernmental
agreement, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance, better known as the Fiscal Compact, was swiftly
negotiated and signed among twenty-five Member States, once
no common agreement could be found for a Treaty revision
which would only concern the euro area, at the European
Council of December 9, 2011.42 Thus, the opposition to a
“constitutional” decision that a few Member States consider to
be essential could not preclude those Member States from
41. European Council Decision No. 2011/199/EU, 2011 O.J. L 91/1. The
decision was adopted under the simplified Treaty revision procedure. TEU post-Lisbon,
supra note 39, art. 48(6), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 42.
42. Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government (Dec. 9, 2011),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/126658.pdf.
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taking that decision among themselves and outside the Treaty
framework.43
The EFSF (2010), the ESM (2012), and the Fiscal Compact
(2012) were followed by the negotiation of an Agreement on the
transfer of nationally collected funds to a European Resolution
Fund to be set up in the framework of the Single Banking
Resolution Mechanism Regulation, both under way at the time
of writing. Responses to the financial crisis were also attempted
through European legislation, notably to try to promote more
coordinated and stricter budgetary policies in the Member
States. However, the so-called Economic Governance
legislation44 had to take account of the limited Treaty capacities
and could not get to the core of national budgetary
prerogatives: under the present economic and monetary union
Treaty provisions, Member States remain sovereign regarding
their economic policy choices, while they lost their monetary
sovereignty several years ago.
In the meantime, calls for a limited Treaty change, notably
by Angela Merkel, to allow the euro area Member States to cope
more efficiently with the consequences of the crisis were left
unanswered.45 The fact is that several Member States, as well as
the European Parliament and the Commission, are afraid,
although not necessarily for the same reasons, of opening a new
Treaty revision process, even for the purpose of limited, targeted
amendments. Most Member States are concerned about the
current political context, including their public opinions, and
worried about opening a Pandora’s box whereby the Treaty
revision process would trigger claims for other changes that
could stand in the way of an agreement. The Parliament and
Commission may also see a risk that the so called Community
method would be watered down in the process. It looks
therefore unlikely that a Treaty revision aimed at strengthening

43. The Fiscal Compact stemmed from the impossibility to agree on a limited
Treaty revision, which would only concern the euro area, because of the opposition of
the United Kingdom that asked for other unrelated Treaty changes in return.
44. The “Six Pack” acts are published in the O.J. L 306 of November 23, 2011;
while the “Two Pack” acts are published in the O.J. L 140 of May 27, 2013.
45. See Derek Scally, Europe Needs a ‘Quantum Leap’ in Economic Integration, Warns
Merkel, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at 1.
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the euro area be envisaged by the Union full membership in the
short term.
The alternative option would then be for the euro area
Member States to conclude among themselves a new agreement
to deepen their integration and give at last a solid and consistent
basis to the economic “leg” of the economic and monetary
union. Such an agreement would be formally outside the
Treaties—as it would not result from a Treaty revision process
and would not be among all the Member States—but would in
reality place itself and its Contracting Parties at the very core of
the European Union—the euro area—(re)creating a sort of
“noyau dur,” which could be called the “Euro Union,”46 within a
larger Union. Thus, it should not be opposed to the existing
European Treaties as less “European” for the mere
circumstance of not being negotiated and concluded according
to Article 48 TEU. It could actually result to be more European
insofar as it would strive to deepen the original European
integration project. That project is not frozen within the
boundaries of the existing Treaties. If it happened that, in a
larger Union, it cannot be further developed by common
accord, as a result of the growing oppositions to change, it could
still be legitimately brought forward on the initiative of a smaller
number of Member States.
The Euro Union members should of course continue to
comply with their obligations as members of the European
Union. As admitted by the Court of Justice, they could share the
European Union institutions for some tasks, provided that such
tasks be in line with those conferred on the Institutions by the
Treaties.47 As far as the Commission is concerned, that would
normally require that its size be reduced so that it recovers some
credibility or, alternatively, that it meets in a reduced
composition (only the members who are nationals of the
participating Member States) when deliberating on Euro issues.
46. See a suggestion in this respect by the Glienicker Group, Towards a Euro
Union, GLIENICKER GROUP (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.glienickergruppe.eu/
english.html.
47. On the conditions under which some Member States may conclude among
themselves international agreements to pursue Union’s objectives, see Alberto de
Gregorio Merino, Institutional Aspects of Variable Geometry: Special Consideration of the
Intergovernmental Method, 66 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 101 (2013).
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On the other hand, it seems difficult to conceive that the
European Parliament be conferred powers in this area: as
transfers of budgetary sovereignty would necessarily take place, a
true democratic legitimacy would be better guaranteed by
establishing appropriate links with national parliaments, who
are the key players in this field.
The Euro Union approach, naturally stemming from the
Single currency, could be extended to other common grounds,
such as tax harmonization, and should remain open to likeminded Member States genuinely wishing to join. Its natural
place would be at the core of a larger European structure, which
it would fit into.
Whether such an approach can find a concrete realization
in a more or less near future, whether it can be regarded as
representing a new “Union method,” the euro area dramatic
events of these years will anyway have shown that, should a
group of Member States be convinced that the existing Treaty
framework no longer allows them, in a too heterogeneous
Union, to deepen their integration links, they cannot be
prevented from pursuing, in a smaller group, the European
integration project.
VI. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS
The European Union, as the European Communities, is not
a (federal) State, and the Constitutional Treaty would not have
turned it into one (see supra Constitutions and Treaties).
However, the Union cannot be assimilated to a classical
international organization either. The Union peculiarity consists
of joining elements of both: it is a union of States and a union of
peoples at the same time. That dual nature is now reflected in
Article 10(2) TEU, which provides that European citizens are
directly represented, at the level of the Union, in the European
Parliament and that Member States are represented in the
European Council by the Heads of State or Government and in
the Council by their respective governments. The Treaty also
illustrates the different ways in which national parliaments may
in turn contribute to the good functioning of the Union.48 It
now also reflects the double legitimacy of the Council in the new
48. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 39, art. 12, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 21.
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double majority voting system due to enter into force on
November 1, 2014, and easy to grasp, at last: the majority of
States, coupled with the majority of population, wins.
The representation of governments and the representation
of peoples have hardly ever evolved at the same pace, the former
being by definition in-built from the beginning in the European
institutional system. There has been a moment though, in the
second half of the seventies, when both lanes ran almost side by
side. Two major steps forward mark the institutional life in those
years: one is the creation of the European Council and the other
is the decision to have the members of the Assembly (the
European Parliament to be) elected by direct universal suffrage.
The Summits, also known as Summit Conferences, always
existed, taking place in European capitals from time to time.
They were institutionalized by the last of their kind, held in
December 1974 in Paris, where the decision was also taken to
hold direct universal elections to the Assembly. The Paris
decision meant that the Heads of State or Government would
meet as the Council in the highest possible composition (which
allowed Member States to leave the Treaties unchanged, as no
new institution was created), three times a year. The European
Council met for the first time on March 10, 1975, in Dublin. It
was a sort of political “take over” of the European decisionmaking by the Heads of State or Government and one which
would allow foreign affairs to be brought progressively into
European deliberations, while remaining formally outside the
Community remit. The European Council was to find its place
in the Treaties with the Single European Act; it was made an
institution by the Lisbon Treaty.
The first direct election of the members of the Assembly
(which would soon be officially called European Parliament, by
virtue of the Single European Act) took place from June 7 to
June 10, 1979, in the nine Member States of the European
Communities. It gave rise to great expectations, which time and
experience would show a posteriori that they were not entirely
justified. A few decades later, the Parliament, in spite of its
denomination and its powers, has lost legitimacy, attracting less
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and less of the European electorates’ attention over the years.49
It did not succeed to fulfill the role which one could have
expected it to play and which Maastricht in particular had
meant for it. In the meantime, the European Council became
the arena where Member States regularly play the core of
European business. In that process, the European Council will
have taken part of the spotlights away from the Council. As for
the European Parliament, it could see its role progressively
taken over again by national parliaments.
The representation of governments has not changed much
over the years. The role of the Council has basically remained
the same over successive Treaty changes, although the
modalities of its functioning, including voting, slightly evolved
(see below). The progressive establishment of the European
Council as the place where the main decisions are taken and the
guidelines are set out for the Union future action, however,
could not but reduce the margin for the Council’s maneuver.
On the other hand, the European Parliament’s is the story of a
quest for increased powers: budgetary powers were conferred
upon the Parliament in 1971 and 1975, legislative ones in 1986
and 1992, and the scope of those powers was enlarged from
Maastricht to Lisbon. As from the eighties, however, the
Parliament also sought to enlarge its powers through
agreements with the other Institutions,50 while each of them
should only act within the limits of the powers conferred on it by
the Treaties.51
The political debate about democratic legitimacy in Europe
has been set to rest for some time now, although probably not
the academic one. More than twenty years ago, at the beginning
of a European Council meeting, a senior Head of State
reminded the president of the European Parliament, who had
just claimed his institution’s legitimacy, that the members of the
European Council were not less democratically legitimate, as
49. The European citizens whom the Parliament is supposed to directly represent
show, every five years, that they feel less and less concerned by the Parliament’s
elections, for which the turnout has kept falling, from sixty-three percent in 1979 to
forty-three percent in 2009.
50. See, e.g., Revision of the Framework Agreement on relations between the
European Parliament and the Commission, 2012 O.J. C 70 /12, at 98.
51. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 39, art. 13(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 22.
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they were themselves all accountable under the respective
constitutional systems. That is now clearly set out in the Treaty.52
What is now more relevant, in this respect, is whether and to
what extent national parliaments should be given a larger say in
Union’s matters.53
As from November 1, 2014, the Council majority voting
system will at last combine the majority of States and the
majority of population.54 That will not make the Council more
legitimate than it already is, but might make the system better
understandable by the public. At the beginning, the votes of the
six members of the Council were weighted according to a mix of
parameters which allowed a political balance (four votes for
Germany, France and Italy, two votes for Belgium and the
Netherlands and one vote for Luxemburg): a qualified majority
required twelve votes out of seventeen and neither the three
“small” nor one single “big” Member State could block a
decision.
The weighting was adapted upon each enlargement up to
1986, without the system being fundamentally altered.
Things got more complicated ten years later, as the
adaptation started giving a relatively greater weight to the
“small” and “medium” Member States, a process which could
only take larger proportions with the prospect of the 2004
enlargement; by that time, the German unification had resulted
in the vote of Germany—which “weighted” 23.5% in 1957—to
fall to 8.4% while that vote was meant to “represent” 17% of the
total Union population. The Convention therefore re-launched
the idea, which had already been flagged in the nineties, of
building the population element into the system; and the Lisbon
Treaty finally settled for a double majority to be reached with
55% of the Member States (today fifteen) and 65% of the
population of the Union (which today would represent 328.6
million people). While it is true that the perfect
52. See id. art. 10(2), at 20 (“Member States are represented in the European
Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national
Parliaments, or to their citizens.”).
53. The role of national parliaments has already been enhanced by the Lisbon
Treaty (see in particular Protocols n° 1 and 2). See PIRIS, supra note 27, at 122–33.
54. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 39, art. 16(4), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 24.
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representativeness could hardly be guaranteed, the dual
majority system is due to better reflect the double legitimacy of
the Council in a European Union which is a union of states and
a union of citizens at the same time.
VII. CITIZENS
Europe needs to recover its citizens’ trust. It is not an easy
task, at a moment when many see Europe as the image of crisis,
the source of tight fiscal policies, if not an obstacle to economic
recovery. Does that mean that citizen’s trust in European
institutions may not come back until tangible results are on
show and employment grows again? That would not be a fair
representation of the relation of citizens to Europe.
It goes without saying that the European Communities,
first, and then the European Union have been set up for the
well-being of the Member States’ citizens. What is hardly ever
highlighted in national political debates, though, is that
generations of European citizens saw their quality of life
improved as a result of the existence of the European Union,
which has allowed them to move freely across borders, to study
and seek jobs, and eventually establish all around Europe, for
over fifty years; and which now allows them to use a single
currency, wherever they are, in a large number of countries.
That is hardly ever said because in politics it is more
beneficial to keep success-stories for oneself, but also because, as
extraordinary as it may seem in the twenty-first century, Europe
is still lacking reconnaissance and visibility among its citizens
and only makes the headlines when the press and social media
need an easy scapegoat. European leaders and politicians never
really undertook, with some notable exception, to explain in
their respective constituencies, what the European integration
process was about, and “who did what and why” at European
level and in the European institutions, of which some of them
were—or had been—a member. They occasionally preferred to
blame the European institutions for the lack of information for
which they—at the national level—were responsible in the first
place, as it has always been self-evident that such a task can only
be handled at the ground level of each Member State, starting
with education.
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Making European citizens and public opinions feel more
connected to, and more concerned by what happens and how it
happens at European level remains after so many years an
urgent need and a repeatedly missed opportunity, even if people
only realize that at times of crisis.
In this respect, the first missed opportunity to change
things and commit to a real effort of information was in 1992, in
the aftermath of the failed Danish referendum on the
Maastricht Treaty: while the October Birmingham European
Council had clearly set citizens’ information as a priority, the
focus was rapidly shifted on the lack of transparency of
European Treaties and legislation, which was held responsible
for detaching citizens’ interest from European matters. An easy
remedy was then found in making the institutions’ (the
Council’s in particular) deliberations and records public, which
the average citizen could obviously not care less about, but
which resulted in a considerable increase of bureaucracy and
costly paper work for the exclusive benefit of a few Brussels
based NGOs and think-tanks. What was not increased however
was the level of citizens’ information about European matters
and their relevance to citizens’ life. Worse—as one would
normally expect people to learn from experience—the same
mistakes were made and another opportunity was missed twelve
years later, when public opinions were confronted with the
Constitutional Treaty, which was then rejected by the French
and by the Dutch citizens. Every time that anti-European parties
and lobbies develop new narratives against European
institutions, be it in the framework of a referendum or of an
economic crisis, they are almost regularly left unchallenged.55
Anti-Europe narratives are easier to tell, and more difficult
to counter, at times of economic difficulties, when young people
facing unemployment are eager to be given a chance. Still, new
generations are also those who benefitted from two decades of
Erasmus programmes; and, as one columnist recently put it for
55. At the time of the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, in the
summer of 1992, the anti-Maastricht camp argued that the entry into force of that
Treaty would be detrimental to the farmers interests, traditionally representing an
important part of the electorate; now, the Common Agricultural Policy was probably
the single area which had been left untouched by the Treaty. Nobody countered that
assertion.
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the International New York Times, “[the] so-called Erasmus
generation—the millions of young men and women who spent
their 20s sharing offices, labs, lecture halls, apartments and beds
across the European Union—is coming of age. They have a duty,
and a privilege, to stand up for Europe.”56
Younger European citizens are the hope of the European
project. They are the first ones who did not wait for anybody to
lecture them about Europe or tell them how to feel about it, but
rather went to find out for themselves. They might act tomorrow
as true European citizens, having a sound and responsible
judgment about something they got to know personally, not
through the media.
CONCLUSION
I have always considered, in my professional life, to be a
privileged person: being paid to do what one likes most, and
believes in, is no doubt a great privilege. Working over all these
years for a project like European integration has been a
challenging and rewarding experience. It has been so in
particular during the past twenty five years, when the European
“constitutional” project saw a new beginning, followed by an
abrupt stop, and is now looking at new, unchartered avenues. Of
course, working for European integration is not about Treaty
writing every day. It may be more obscure and involve more
technical day-to-day work, and still be rewarding though,
whenever the work is accompanied by a vision. In that case, one
is less affected and keeps doing his or her best, when the mood
turns doubtful, if not pessimistic.
The mood about European integration has periodically
changed over the last four decades: there have been periods of
high and periods of low, one cannot always have bright skies.
Today the overall mood is not euro enthusiast, as it wasn’t either
when I started working for the Council of European Union, in
Brussels, many years ago. In the meantime, I made the direct
experience that European integration is not a process which one
can expect to be definitely accomplished over a few decades: it
56. Beppe Severgnini, Op-Ed, Can the European Center Hold?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/opinion/severgnini-can-the-europeancenter-hold.html?_r=0.

2014]

FORTY YEARS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

1479

needs time, as it needs to go through highs and lows. If one
takes a look at European integration over a longer period, one
can see that it always ends up overcoming critical moments, even
when the process seems to be at a standstill and trust is at its
lowest: the institutional crisis which followed the Luxembourg
compromise ended in the Spring 1982 (without waiting for the
Single European Act), when the Belgian Presidency decided to
go for a vote in the Council; the euro sclerosis period which
followed the economic crisis in between the seventies and the
eighties went away with the Single Market programme. True,
people want to see results, in particular at times of economic
difficulties; and politicians may not wish to talk about the
medium-term when they seek to be (re)elected. Those are the
moments when one prays to have (or badly regrets not to have)
true political leaders, a rare category of politicians who have
“leadership,” i.e. at home, the capacity, to tell electorates the
tough truth and aren’t afraid of not being (re)elected for doing
so; and, in Europe, the capacity to promote integration in the
most efficient way, beyond vested institutional interests.
Traditionally, European integration has progressed
through the impulse of concerted Franco-German action;
Giscard d’Estaing-Schmidt in the late seventies and KohlMitterrand, between the eighties and the nineties, are the easiest
examples which come to mind, the latter tandem being
supported by Jacques Delors in the Commission’s Chair. There
has alas been no such thing for quite some time now. Angela
Merkel has been leading Europe alone for some years and has
found support in the financial crisis only from Mario Draghi,
President of the European Central Bank, the truly supranational
institution today.
If political leadership is essential to keep European
integration moving, the work of the European administration—
unrelentlessly keeping through changes in Member States
governments, political legislatures and mandates—is also
important, though regularly underscored, if not openly
criticized. The European Institutions’ officials—whom the
media like to refer to as “Eurocrats”—are those who draft
proposals, amendments, and compromises, on the basis of
which legislation is passed and decisions are taken. As officials,
however, they do not—and should not—take political
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responsibility, which is for the Commission, for MEPs and for
the members of the Council to take. Overtime, I had the chance
to come across dozens of extraordinary men and women
working hard behind the scenes, who greatly contributed to
make European integration progress in different areas and
whose names are hardly known to the public. Officials do not
appear in the forefront, they do not sign Treaties in front of the
cameras, though they happen to impulse the action of political
leaders: one can think of Jean Monnet, behind Robert Schuman
during the very first steps of European integration, and JeanClaude Piris, who helped Angela Merkel on the Lisbon Treaty
after seeing four more Treaties through.
Reconnecting citizens to the Union remains the priority for
the years to come, at a time when populism is spreading all over
in Member States. The challenge, to that end, is to stop
antagonizing the national and European levels and succeed in
reconciling national interests within the search for a higher
European consensus. Again, a difficult task today, but one worth
undertaking by national and European leaders and by the
society at large, as it is still worth explaining that answers to
economic problems are harder, if not impossible, to find outside
Europe and that Member States—big or small—cannot cope
alone with global crises in today’s world.
To think about Europe tomorrow is to think about the next
generation: those who will have voted for the first time in May,
or have done so five years ago, those who may take up public
responsibilities in the ten years to come, those who have had, or
are having now, a direct experience of Europe and might
choose to be personally involved in order to have an impact on
our common future. Wishing them to be successful in pursuing,
with renewed vigor and imagination, a European dream.

